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SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO
SANCTIONS AGAINST WAR CRIDWALS
Mitchell Franklin
The author, Major Franklin, is the W. R. Irby Professor of Law in
Tulane University Law School; A.B., 1922, Harvard; LL.B., 1925; S. T.
D., 1928. He is on leave in the armed forces of the United States. The
ideas developed in this essay state the personal theory of the writer, and
in no way reflect official thinking. There is a short bibliography of AngloAmerican legal writing on war criminals in Wright, War Criminals, 39
Am. J. Int. Law 257, notes 1 and 2 (1945).-EmoR.

Purpose of Sanctions Against War Criminals
"A war may be lost. The most ill-fated war is never irretrievable.
The worst peace is never final. But a Revolution must be won. A
Revolution occurs once only."'

These are the words of Moeller van den Bruck, perhaps the
best known of the popular ideologists accepted by German
National Socialism. The vocation of our time in regard to the
punishment of war criminals may be ascertained from this text,
which was written immediately after the close of the last war.
In stating the ideological nature of the war which has resulted
in the occupation of the entire German Reich, Moeller van
den Bruck makes it evident that the invocation of sanctions
against National Socialist war criminals is related to the problem of the prevention of another great war.
Certainly, the war has been understood as an ideological
war, not only by the National Socialists, but also by those who
have vanquished National Socialism. Thus, even though
Article 43 of the Annex to Hague Convention IV of 18 October 1907 imposes on the military occupants of the Reich the
duty of:
"..

. respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the

country,2

The military government for Germany immediately on _he occupation of the Reich "deprived of effect" certain "fundamental Nazi laws enacted since 30 January 1933," and introduced
a "general suspending clause" designed to prevent the fulfillment of National Socialist ideological conceptions relating to
racial, national or religious discrimination, and commanded
that:
I Moeller van den Bruck, Gemany's Third Empire (Lorimer's tr.,
1934) 17. 'True to his own ideas and to the old military traditions,
Ludendorff conceived the armistice as no more than a momentary suspension of hostilities. This conception in no way prevented him from
contemplating immediate peace, which had become a necessity, and the
grave consequences it would entail." Vermeil, "Germany's Three Reichs"
(Dickes' tr., 1944) 8.
2 See, in general, Schwenk: Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 Yale Law J. 393 (1945),
who seems to advance a concept which might be called ideological necessity (at p. 407). See, however, the discussion of the Volk8gemeinschaft,
infra.
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"The interpretation and application of German law in accordance with
National Socialist doctrines, however or whenever enunciated, are prohibited."

The prevention of another ideological war is therefore an
aim to be attained through the imposition of penal sanctions
against National Socialists for crimes in fact committed by
them during the present war.
Indeed, there have been four classes of war crimes in the
present war. (1). There have been violations of the internal
law of various states, which will be punished under the laws
of the states affronted, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943. (2). There have been violations
of general international laws relating to the conduct of war,
which will be punished under general international criminal
law, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration. (3). There
have been violations of international law in fascist preparations
(Unternehmen) for war. These crimes were committed not
only against the peoples of other states, but also against certain
sections of the German population itself. The validity of this
class of crime derives, in part, from the concept of unjust war,
and is the crime of undertaking unjust war. (4). There have
been violations of general international criminal law for which
punishment will be inflicted on the Germans responsible for
declaring unjust war, that is, war which is illegal or historically
unjust or unjustified, because it is predatory and imperialistic
or violates general international law forbidding such war. The
theory of the unjust war was expressed by Generalissimo Stalin
as early as 1941, when he said:
"The Germans are now waging . . . an unjust war calculated for the
seizure of foreign territory and the conquest of other peoples . . . the

Soviet Union and its Allies are waging a war of liberation-a just war
calculated for the liberation 4of the enslaved peoples of Europe and the
USSR from Hitler tyranny."

The Generalissimo's theory essentially became the official
American theory on 8 July 1945 through the declaration of
Justice Jackson, in which he criticized nineteenth century
theories of international law opposed to the concept of unjust
war 5 as
"... a departure from the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of
international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the
3 This phrase is used to describe international law which is general,
not because it has the theoretical support of all states, but because it
has become a general force through the strength of the five great powers
which were capable of fighting against aggression. This usage therefore
is intended to reflect the outcome of the San Francisco conference. Hence
this meaning is the precise opposite of Kelsen's, for whom "general or
common international law is customary law, valid for all states belonging to the international community." Kelsen, "Law and Peace in International Relations" (1942) 30-31.
4 The New York Times, 7 November 1941, p. 6. c. 6.
5 See Nussbaum, Just War-A Legal Concept? 42 Michigan Law
Rev. 453 (1943) ; von Elbe, Concept of Just War in International Law,
83 Am. J. Int. Law 665 (1939). The chief theoretical defender of the
theory of the just war has been Kelsen, supra, note 3, at p. 35.
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unjust war-the war of defense and the war of aggression... By the
time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war.., was illegal ... It is high time that we act on
the juridical
principle that aggressive warmaking is illegal and crimi6
nal."1

It is not an historical accident that both Generalissimo Stalin
and Justice Jackson reflect Grotian ideas of international law;
for Grotius' secularized, anti-medieval conception of natural
law presupposed the historical existence and the scientific ascertainment of objective truth on which the validity of the conception of the just war depends. Therefore the conception of
the just war is a break with nineteenth century subjectivism,
7
idealism, scepticism and positivism.
Source of International Criminal Law:
InternationalPublic Opinion
The starting point for a discussion of the punishment of war

criminals must be Hague Convention IV of 18 October 1907,
governing the laws and customs of war on land. Although
this basic text of general international law was preceded by the

instructions prepared by Francis Lieber for the Union army
during the American Civil War, Hague Convention IV is essentially the handiwork of modern European scholarship and
as such essentially reflects the traditions of modem Roman law
and of modern Romanist codification. Hence, the French text

of the convention, which is the authoritative formulation, will
be distorted or misunderstood, if it is conceived of exclusively
in accordance with Anglo-American conceptions of legal or
juridical method, and if it is conceived of without recognizing

modern juristic theories concerning the role of purpose in law.
Of course, Lieber himself, who had been educated at Jena,
was a Romanist.

Therefore, it may be said that certain mili-

tary law of the United States almost for a century has been in
advance of the non-military law of the United States, which is
still fettered by Anglo-American prejudices against codifica-

tion.

In this respect, however, the army has adhered to the

6 The New York Times, 8 June 1945, p. 4, c. 6. The Jeffersonian
concept of unjust aggression is concrete and historical, not abstract.
Thus Jefferson said in 1802 that the United States would not have been
justified in initiating war against a "pacific" and "feeble" Spain for
control of Louisiana. But an American war to seize Louisiana from
imperialistic Napoleonic France would have been justified after Spain
had transferred Louisiana to France, even though the war meant the
bursting of a "tornado on both sides of the Atlantic." See Jefferson's
correspondence with Robert Livingston and du Pont de Nemours in April
1802.
7See Harris: Idealism Emergent in Jurisprudence,10 Tulane Law
Rev. 169 (1936). On the concept of international criminal law, which
is said to derive from Bentham, see von Liszt, Lehrbuch des Deutschen
Strafrechts (25. Auf., 1927) 123-125.
1 On the types of war crimes, see Article 6,Constitution of the International Military Tribunal. The New York' Times, 9 August 1945, p.
10, c. 3. Fraenkel suggests "occupation crimes" as another type of war
crime. Fraenkel, "Military Occupation and the Rule of Law," c. 3
(1944).
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tendencies toward codification reflected in the American constitution itself.
Nevertheless, it must be reiterated that Hague Convention
IV will be ineffectual and distorted as a code or partial code,
if it is not interpreted and administered, in accordance with
Romanist conceptions relating to juridical method, as well as
in-accordance with the purposes or goals stated in the very text
of the convention itself. Earlier in the twentieth century
Dean Pound introduced into American legal thought the
knowledge that law is a complex conception, based on the
interrelations of three constituent elements - legal precepts,
legal method, and received ideas or ideals as to the purpose of
law. The legal precepts are the formulations of the content of
law. Popularly, they are."the" law. Moreover, these precepts
differ in flexibility, depending on whether they are rules, concepts, principles or standards. Legal method refers to the professionally accepted method of thought relative to the interpretation and administration of legal precepts as well as to the
disposition of unanticipated and unprovided for legal problems. The legal method of Roman law and of Anglo-American common law differ profoundly, particularly in that the
former may employ legislation by analogy to decide unanticipated legal problems. The received ideals of a legal system
are the historically dominant and accepted conceptions relating to the purpose of legal precepts and of legal method, so
that economic, political and philosophical ideas thus assert
themselves directly on the law. Therefore, like other such legal texts, Hague Convention IV must be considered as a series
of precepts, subject to Roman law conceptions of juridical
method, and reflecting certain goals or aims, stated or presupposed.
Thus conceived of as a work of modem Roman law, certain
texts of Hague Convention IV acquire special importance. As
a juridical act of general international law, the convention
could have made its formulations exclusive, and thus could
have precluded further development of the convention as new
historical situations unfolded. However, in accordance with
the traditions of Romanist private law codes, the convention
rejects this outlook, and subjects the states adhering to the convention to the effect of such historical development. Thus, the
preamble of the convention states that
"Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the
High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among

civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."
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The formulation is particularly in the tradition of the great
eighteenth century Romanist codes which did not restrict development merely in accordance with past usages ("usages
established"), but takes account of the aspirations of the peoples of the world, or, more exactly, of their international public opinion, as this is understood in the eighteenth century
French-Jeffersonian conception ("the laws of humanity"; "the
dictates of the public conscience"), as a source of international
law to be utilized in developing the convention to meet the
new situations disclosed to it by the course of history. In this
respect the convention accepts the theory of the Louisiana
Civil Code, the only Roman law code in vigor among the
American states, which, following the French projet of the
Year VIII (1800), provides in Article 21:
"In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound
to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to' 8natural law and reason, or received usages, where
positive law is silent.

In accordance, then, with Romanist traditions concerning legal method, gaps in Hague Convention IV, as disclosed by the
course of history, explicitly are to be closed by reference to
international public opinion reflecting the purposes of the convention. In precise words, democratic public opinion9 has
been received as a source of law through Hague Convention
IV, and is translated into a force through successful belligerent
action.
In consecrating the authoritative role of the public opinion
of the peoples of the world as a source of general international
law, the convention by no means justifies an arbitrary or subjective determination of the content of international law. On
the contrary, public opinion in the eighteenth century democratic sense is the secure anchor on which to ground the development of the texts of the convention. Hence, the preamble
of Hague Convention IV says:
"...
the High Contracting Parties do not intend that unforeseen cases
should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the'arbitrary
judgment of military commanders."

It is in accordance with Romanist traditions concerning
legal method to suggest that international public opinion may
8
See Franklin: Brutus the American Praetor,15 Tulane Law Rev.
16 (1940).
9 In Jeffersonian ideology public opinion is also the decisive force in
American constitutional law. See opinion of Justice Johnson in United
States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), and Franklin: War Power of the
President: An Historical Justification of Mr. Roosevelt's Message of
Sept. 7, 1942, 17 Tulane Law Rev. 217, 250 (1942).
Cf. Kelsen, who says: "Some writers, abandoning the positivist
view, maintain that not only custom and treaties, but also the general
principles of law are to be considered as sources of international law.
This doctrine is very questionable." Kelsen: Collective and Individual
Responsibility in International Law, With ParticularRegard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 Cal. Law Rev. 530, 543-544 (1943). Kelsen cites 37 An... Int. Law 663 (1943).
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justify the development or the expansion on certain occasions
of the texts of Hague Convention IV and of other authoritative
texts of general international law in order to control situations
not in fact foreseen in the convention of 1907. In Roman law,
legislative or executive texts furnish analogies from which legal
development proceeds. A Romanist text may decide issues by
analogy which it does not control by genuine interpretation.
Even though the juridical method of Anglo-American law justifies the employment only of judicial decisions analogically,
it should be evident that the juridical method of the Roman
law, which prefers to use legislation analogically, is a resource
of the greatest value, both in preventing arbitrary legal solutions and in permitting nevertheless further legal development
in accordance with modem sources of law, such as international
public opinion.
Of course international public opinion as a source of international law by no means is limited to the analogical development of the existing texts of Hague Convention IV and of
similar formulations of international law. The preamble itself to Hague Convention IV distinguishes between the laws of
humanity and "the dictates of the public conscience" and
-usages established" (among which are the formulations of
Hague Convention IV itself), giving the former a scope not
limited merely to the analogical development of Hague Convention IV. In addition to this, the ideological nature of the
present war, the fragmentary and XII Tablelike character of
Hague Convention IV and of other written texts of international law, the urgent need for development of international
law in accordance with the outcome of the conferences at San
Francisco and elsewhere, demand that international public
opinion be conceived of more broadly than as a mere device
to develop the existing international texts by analogy. Nevertheless, great advance can be made even in accordance with the
method of development of existing texts of international law
by analogy.
Source of Theory of Plural Responsibility in
International Criminal Law
The basic principle derived from Article 50 of Hague Convention IV by analogy provides a basis for collective penalties
to be imposed on fascist war criminals. This possibility is
opened up even by the inaccurate English translation of this
text, which reads:
"No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the
population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot
be regarded as jointly and severally responsible."

Even though article 50 is devoted to the recognition of plural
responsibility for acts of individuals committed during a mili-
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tary occupation, it also justifies by analogy a similar theoretical
basis for imposing collective penalties on members of the National Socialist party, on members of the different affiliated and
sympathetic "purpose" (Zweck) or ideological organizations
or formations, on members of the different groups whose economic interest was served by National Socialism, etc. for acts
which occurred even prior to the military occupation of the
Reich.
The significance of Article 50 of Hague Convention IV may
be better understood from a more accurate English translation
of the authoritative French text. Article 50 is a text of Roman
law, and loses its precision of meaning if its Romanist concepts
are translated in terms of Anglo-American common law.10 An
English translation, which takes account of the Romanism of
Article 50, would read:
"No collective punishment (peine collective), pecuniary or otherwise,
shall be inflicted on populations because of individual acts (faits individuels) for which they cannot be considered as solidarily responsible
(solidairement responsables).11

The most important difference between the authoritative
French text and the English translation is that "solidairement
responsables" is translated into English as "jointly and severally" responsible instead of as "solidarily responsible.' 122
The criteria for solidary responsibility in the modem Roman
law are set forth in Article 2324 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which is an article concerned with delictal rather than with
criminal responsibility:
"He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act."
10 Hence, Anglo-American legal writers, who obviously have been
uneasy and uncomfortable in the presence of Article 50, complain that
it lacks certainty. See Garner: Community Fine3 and Collective Responsibility, 11 Am.J. Int. Law 511, 529 (1917); 3 Hyde, "International
Law" (2d Rev. Ed., 1945) 1889.
11 On civil solidarity in French law, see Article 1200 of the French
civil code (Code civil francais=C.civ.fr.); on penal solidarity; see Article 55 of the French criminal code (Code pinal=C. p6n.). The French
criminal law of solidarity "obeys" the civil law of solidarity, but its role
is limited to responsibility for the payment of fines. Vidal, Cours de
droit-driminel et de science pinitentiare (8e id., 1935) nos 574-576 bis;
Garraud et Laborde-Lacoste, Expos6 ndthodique de droit pinal (4e
id., 1942) no 501. However, the limitation of Article 55, C. p6n., to fines,
does not correspondingly limit Article 50, Hague Convention IV, as the
latter text applies to collective punishment "pecuniary or otherwise."
Of course there are other differences. See also Article 231, StGB, and
Article 830, BGB, infra, note 27.
12 The various errors in the English translation of Hague Convention IV seem to derive from the translation in Scott, "The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907" (2d. ed., 1915). See also
Schwenk, supra, note 2, at p. 393, note 1.
Article 50 employed the word "solidairement" in the French texts
of both 1899 and 1907. Scott, Les conventions et diclarationsde la Haye
de 1899 et 1907 (1918) 124. But the English translation of 1899 translates this as "collectively" responsible. The phrase "jointly and severally" responsible was first introduced in the 1907 translation. See Scott,
supra, 124.
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In other words, the tests of solidary penal accountability for
purposes of plural responsibility under Article 50, Hague Convention IV, are not only taken from the delictal rather than
from the criminal law, but are extremely broad, resting either
on an objective element, such as "cause" or "assistance" or on a
subjective element, such as "encouragement." However, what
is most to be noticed at this point is that the tests of solidary
penal responsibility derive essentially from the law of delict
("tort") rather than from criminal law for the purposes of
general international criminal law, as Article 50 replaces the
tests of the criminal law with the tests of the delictal law so far
as plural responsibility is concerned.
This conception of the role of Article 50 justifies the Moscow Declaration, announced by the late President Roosevelt,
former Premier Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin on 1 November 1943, in which they said:
"... German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have

been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in
which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be
judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries
and of the free governments which will be created therein... The above
declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals, whose
offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be
punished by joint decision of the governments of the Allies."

Indeed, the "unEnglish" phrase, "consenting part", which is
not the usual language of the Anglo-American criminal law,
becomes significant in relation to the essentially Romanist concept of solidary responsibility, similar to that expressed in the
text of the Louisiana civil code, with its recognition of "encouragement" as a ground for collective responsibility.
Source of Theory of Defenses in International Criminal Law

However, the role of Article 50, Hague Convention IV, is
not limited to the establishment of the plural responsibility of
those who have taken a "consenting part." In advancing the
theory of solidary responsibility, the purport of Article 50 does
not merely replace, within criminal law itself, ideas of modern
Roman criminal law concerning participation in crime (that
is, "principal", "accessory", etc.) with the essentially delictal
ideas of Roman law. Romanist theories of criminal participation or of criminal complicity are thus replaced by Romanist
theories of participation essentially derived from the law of
delict.
But in consecrating the essentially delictal theory of solidary
responsibility, Article 50 also replaces the conceptions of Romanist criminal law relating to defenses - excuses and justifications - with the conceptions of Romanist delictal law relating
to defenses for purposes of general international criminal law.
What this should connote is that the defense of superior
order is not a valid defense in general international criminal
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law, at least not in an absolute sense, because such defense need
not be accepted in delictal proceedings based on solidary responsibility. There is increasing support of this position. Until 15 November 1944 the American Rules of Land Warfare
provided through Article 347 that:
"Individuals of the armed forces will not be punished for these offenses

in case they are committed under the orders or sanctions of their government or commanders."
However, after that date, a new text, Article 345.1, was in-

troduced, providing:
"Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished therefor. However, the fact that the acts
complained of were done pursuant to order of a superior or government
sanction may be taken into consideration in determining 3 culpability,
either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment."1

Indeed, even in England, where the defense of superior order
seems to have had much support, it was not always accepted,
not at least in the seventeenth century at the trials of those
involved in the execution of the king; for in Axtell's Case 14 it
was said that:
"... where the command is traitorous, there obedience to that command
is also traitorous."

Perhaps the earliest modem show of dissatisfaction as to the
role of the defense of necessity in criminal proceedings was indicated in Article 193, fragment 28, of the Criminal Code of
1926 of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. This
text, which is part of Chapter IX, provides:
"Any act of robbery, pillage, illegal destruction of property, or violence,
or any illegal taking of property under pretext of military necessity
committed in respect of the population of an area of military operations
entails deprivation of liberty for a period of not less than three years,

with or without confiscation of property; but where there are aggravating circumstances it entails the supreme measure-of social defense and
confiscation of property."'I.

A note adds:
"Participation in military crimes by persons not mentioned in the present article entails responsibility under the relevant articles of Chapter
IX of the present code."

As the defense of superior order, to no small extent, reflects
theory as to the role of necessity as a defense in criminal law,
the refusal of the Russians as far back as 1926 to accept the
defense of military necessity from Russians accused of certain
military crimes is significant. Under the basic idea of Article
50, Hague Convention IV, which substitutes the theory of
13 See Pope, Book Review, 31 Va. Law Rev. 739, 742 (1945). To the
same effect Art. 8, Constitution of the International Military Tribunal.
The N. Y. Times, 9 August 1945, p. 10, c. 3. See general discussion in
Lauterpacht; The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes,
Brit. Yr. Bk. of Interhat. Law, XXI, 58, 69 (1944).
14J. Kel. 13 (1660).

15 The Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic
(Foreign Office tr., 1934) 75. A somewhat different translation is given
in Taracouzio; The Soviet Union and InternationalLaw (1935) 331.
Under Article 129, MStGB, "urgent need" in such cases would be a
defense, contrary to Soviet law.
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delictal defenses in plural prosecutions under general international criminal law, the defense of superior order should be
rejected, and it has been rejected through the formulation at
Moscow of the conception of the "consenting party."
German military law also has addressed itself to the problem
of the defense of superior order.
The Moscow Declaration says that war criminals will be
judged and punished according to the "laws of the liberated
countries and of the free governments which will be erected
therein" or "by joint decision of the governments of the Allies." German law, then, will not be the basis for the punishment of war criminals, contrary to the foolish practice in the
abortive trials following the last war. German law is of importance only in the trials of war criminals by some future
anti-fascist German regime, or only if it can be said to correspond to international public opinion, within the meaning of
the preamble to Hague Convention IV.
A basic text for the treatment of certain war criminals under
German law is Article 47 of the German Military Criminal
Code (Militdrstrafgesetzbuch=MStGB) of 10 October 1940.
This code of military criminal law has not been mentioned in
Anglo-American theoretical discussions of war criminals, and
it maybe surmised that the Anglo-American legal world is unaware that the old German Militiirstrafgesetzbuchof 1872 has
been superseded. Even very recent Anglo-American discussion
of German theory has been confined to the text of 1872, as if
it were still in vigor. Moreover, it has been assumed that the
text of the code of 1872 means what every German judge, in
war or peace, says it means, as if this law were a "common law
statute" in an Anglo-American jurisdiction. However, this is
not the place to criticize, from the point of view of doctrine,
the interpretation of the German military criminal code of
1872 by German judges in the trial of war criminals following
the last war. It is sufficient to say that in modern Roman law
there is no concept of judicial stare decisis, as this is understood
in the Anglo-American legal world, and that the opinion of a
particular theoretical or doctrinal writer is not, in itself, decisive.
Article 47, MStGB, text of 1940, in an important respect
differs markedly from Article 47 in the version of 1872. The
present text says:
"(1.) If a criminal law (Strafgesetz) is violated through the execution
of an order in a matter pertaining to the service, the superior giving the
order is alone responsible. The subordinate who obeys such an order
however is punishable as a participant:
1. if he has exceeded the order given him, or
2. if he knew that the order of the superior concerned an act,
which had in view (bezweckte) a general (allgemeines) or
military major or minor crime (militdrisches Verbrechen oder

Vergehen).
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"(2.) If the guilt of the subordinate is trivial, he may be exempted
from punishment."

Even under the older code of 1872, Heinrich Dietz, the important German military jurist, said that
"MStGB does not know blind soldierly obedience," 18

and under the new code of 1940 the jurist of the same name
says:
".... however, according to German military criminal law, there is no
unquestionable, blind obedience; the racial eminence and the state of
education of the German soldier class require obedience based on perception (sehenden. Gehorsam)."1

In the last stages of the war, it is recalled that newspapers
reported that the Fiihrerexpressly gave the lower ranks of the
German army power to disobey higher ranking officers under
conditions of impending defeat, when the stability and survival of the German fascist regime was in question because of
the probable disloyalty of certain sections of the army. This
power of the subordinate to disobey the superior command is
admitted by National Socialist military jurists. Thus, in his
discussion of Article 47, MStGB, Rittau says that the subordinate need not obey the command of the superior if it affects:
"his honor, his respect, his military position, his soundness, his life, his
economic being..."Is

Indeed, from an historical point of view, it seems that it is
chiefly in the United States, the classic land of individualist
theory, that the defense of superior command has been supported as an absolute defense. But elsewhere it has been perceived that this absolutism defeats its very purpose under
circumstances of attempted coup d'Etat. Like all inflexible conceptions, the theory of the absolute defense of superior command thus becomes a contradiction. Hence, German military
legal theory seems to have provided itself with means of escape from the effects of the absolute defense of superioi command. The contradictions in absolutist notions of the defense
of superior order are also shown in the apparent refusal of
National Socialist jurists to recognize the defense of superior
order when the war crime is committed by a military subordinate of an army with which Germany is engaged in war. Thus,
Rittau writes that prisoners of war in German prison camps
may be punished for:
"... the common war crimes committed on the command of an officer,
19

such as plundering, rape, mistreatment of civil population."'

16Dietz, Militrsirafrecht und Militdrstrafverfahren, in Holtzendorff-Kohler, Enzyklopidie der Rechtswissenschaft (7.Auf., 1914) V,
207, 221.
17 Dietz, Wehrmachtdisziplinarstrafordnungvom 6 Juni 1942 (1943)
49.
1sRittau, Militr8trafgesetzbuch (4.Auf., 1943) 104.

19 Rittau, supra, note 18, at p. 221.
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It has been shown that English law, under the revolutionary
conditions of the seventeenth century, also rejected the absolute defense of superior command.20
However, in this matter French legal theory has been most
conscious, coherent and honest in supporting a relativist conception of the defense of superior order. In their discussions
of l'ordre de la loi et commandement de l'autoritd legitime
French jurists advance the relativist theory of reasoned obedience (obeissance "raisonne"), according to which the military inferior may "resist" an illegal order. This conception is
contrary to the absolutist theory of passive obedience (obiissance "passive"), which refuses the subordinate "the faculty of
discussion." Moreover, there is in France an "intermediate"
theory, which legitimates the refusal of obedience to a command, the illegality of which is
"certain, evident (as well as the command to commit a crime, a delict,

etc.)

"21

Hugueney, who adheres to a theory of responsibility for "evident illegality," discusses the problem of the responsibility of
the military inferior who has been commanded to commit a
coup d'Etat. He insists particularly on the increased responsibility of the intermediate officer, such as a colonel, because of
his greater opportunity to "appreciate the illegality of the act"
pertaining to the attempted seizure of state power.2 Hugueney
invokes Napoleon, who favored imposing penal responsibility
on inferiors who obeyed illegal orders "to give up their arms
and to receive chains." 2 3
This material, taken from National Socialist and French and
English sources, thus seems to impair Kelsen's justification
"from a military point of view" of the defense of superior
order and of Article 347, Rules of Land Warfare. 24 However,
introducArticle 347 has been since veered about through the 25
tion of Article 345.1 into the Rules of Land Warfare.
Despite their glorification, of the intellectual independence
of the German soldier, German military legal theorists and
judges, when they are thinking in terms of the submission of
the military subordinate to the commands of the German regime in power, long since seem to have "sapped" (in JefferSee note 14, supra.
So

Garraud et Laborde-Lacoste, supra, note 11, at no 93. See also
Vidal, supra, note 11, at nos 186-188, who says that a military person
"has the right and the duty to refuse obedience when the illegality of
the act which is commanded to him is evident." The basic text in French
law is
22 Article 327, C. p6n.; see also Article 205, Code de justice umilitaire.
Hugueney, Trait thdorique et pratique de droit pdnaI et de procidure p~nale militaires (1933) no 334.
23 Hugueney cites Mdmoires de Napolgon, VIII, 272.
24 Kelsen, supra, note 9, at p. 556.
25 See supra, note 13. See Art. 89 of the Brazilian Projet of 1943 for
a military Criminal Code. Projeto de codigo penal militair in Arguiro de
d'rifo 7ailitar,I, 175 (1943).
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son's use of the word) Article 47, MStGB. Although this is true
in regard both to the text of 1872 and that of 1940, the military
jurist Schwinge, discussing the 1872 version of this article, said
as recently as 1936:
"Article 47-without doubt miscarrying in text and legally-politicallymost highly assailable - is one of the most obscure dispositions of
MStGB."26

However, the changes introduced into the 1940 version of
MStGB worsen even more seriously than Schwinge had suggested in 1936 the "legal-political" position of National
Socialist war criminals. But even under the old MStGB
Schwinge's alarm was justified, particularly as to members of
organizations which avowedly had illegal objectives, such as
"purpose" (Zweck) or ideological formations. Such persons
were put in perilous position under Article 47, MStGB, even
as it had been undermined by German military jurists; for the
effect of their "sapping" merely seems to have been that of
validating the defense of superior order for German soldiers.
or functionaries who were not organized in "purpose" or ideological groups. This is because the 1872 text of paragraph (1)
2, Article 47, MStGB, unequivocally imposes responsibility
on those subordinates who "knew" that the superior "had in
view" (bezweckte) a crime, and hence on those persons who
belonged to organizations destined to fulfill illegal "purpose"
or ideology.
This theory as to the significance of the text of 1872 is.
sharpened by the effect of the analogy of Article 50, Hague
Convention IV, which makes participants responsible solidarily. As Article 50 rests on a delictal rather than on a penal
basis, Article 830 of the German Civil Code (Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch=BGB), which is a delictal text, thus becomes. relevant:
"If several persons have caused any damage by an act committed in
common, each is responsible for the damage. The same rule applies if
it cannot be discovered which of several participants has actually caused
the damage.
2T
"Instigators and accomplices are in the same position as joint-doers."

In their discussion of paragraph (1) 2, Article 47, MStGB,
which in this respect remains unaltered in the 1940 version,
National Socialist military jurists have maintained that the
"knowledge" test in that formulation virtually had the effect
of justifying the defense of superior order. In essence, they
have said that actual knowledge of the illegahty of the command rarely can be.proved, particularly since knowledge of the
illegality of the military command must be determined in rela21'Schwinge, Militdrstrafgesefzbuch (1936) 100. Schwinge's subsequent writings, which are known to exist, are not available to this

writer.
27
182.

This translation is from Wang, "The German Civil Code" (1907>

See also note 11, supra; and Article 840, BGB.
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tion to the presuppositions and circumstances under which it
was issued as well as in relation to the intention of the superior
making the command. These are illusive or subjective elements, these jurists in effect have said, which rarely can be
known to the military inferior. Hence the latter in practically
all instances lacks "knowledge," and cannot be held guilty of
obeying the illegal command. However, even if this questionable interpretation of Article 47, MStGB, is accepted as regards
German soldiers who did not belong to the National Socialist
party or its organized "purpose" formations, it is without importance as regards those war criminals who belonged in fact
to the National Socialist party, or to National Socialist "purpose" or ideological organizations. As to such persons, paragraph (1) 2, Article 47, MStGB, buttressed by Article 830,
BGB, wipes out the defense of superior order because they do
have, by virtue of the fascist aims of the National Socialist
organizations to which they belonged, the requisite "knowledge." The concept of the "consenting party", as stated in the
Moscow Declaration, thus might be described as a paraphrase
of this effect of Article 47, MStGB.
Source of ParticularCrimes in InternationalCriminalLaw
In that it vastly increased the source of particular war crimes,
the 1940 text of paragraph (1) 2, Article 47, MStGB, makes the
position of National Socialist war criminals much more insecure than it had been under the text of 1872. Thus Schwinge
would have found the 1940 formulation of Article 47, MStGB,
even more "legally-politically assailable" than the wording
which had alarmed him in 1936. The difference between the
effect of the text of 1872 and that of 1940 is that the new formulation comprehends general international criminal law, unlike the version of 1872.
The 1940 text makes the subordinate responsible for committing
"a general (allgemeines) or military major or minor crime,"

whereas the 1872 text merely made the subordinate responsible for the commission of
"a civil (biirgerliches) or military major or minor crime."

The transformation of the adjective "civil" (birgerliches)
into the adjective "general" (allgemeines) between 1872 and
1940 is not a mere reflection of National Socialist ideas of form
of legal redaction. The word "civil" is a proper correlative to
the word "military", and it meant this in the text of 1872, so
that the old text of Aricle 47, MStGB, comprised all "civilian"
and military crimes. However, the phrase "civil" law also connotes the private law, or the law obtaining in civil society
(in the eighteenth century sense), as in the phrase "civil code"
(Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch). In this sense "civil" indicated a
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distinction between private and public law, a distinction to
which National Socialism is antagonistic, for in National Socialist legal theory the distinction between public and private
law must be obliterated: private law must become public law.
The change from "civil" to "general" thus in part accomplishes
the important National Socialist legal aim of interpenetrating
types of law, the result of which is that Article 47, MStGB, now
refers to all situations, military or civilian, "public" or "private," internal ("domestic") or external ("international"), so
far as they are crimes under German law, including international undertakings, such as Hague Convention IV, having the
force of law in the Reich.
With more, precision, it may be stated that the effect of the
change from "civil" to "general" is to submit individuals subject to the German Militdrstrafgesetzbuch of 1940 directly to
the effect of general international criminal law, at least so far
as German internal law is concerned. Thus, Germany sought
to fulfill its duties under Article 1, Hague Convention IV, in
which the ratifying states agree to
"issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land..."

and under Article 3, Hague Convention 1V, in which the ratifying states agree that
"A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regula-

tions shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay indemnity. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed
forces."

The effect of the substitution of the word "general" in the
National Socialist sense, for the word "civil," becomes, then,
that of making German individuals directly responsible, at
least in German courts, to texts of international validity having
the force of law in Germany. Germany itself makes individuals
subject to the Militiirstrafgesetzbuch of 1940 directly reponsible to the texts of general international law as received within
Germany at least for the purposes of the German courts and
German administration.
However, this does not exhaust the great import of the reception of the word "general" into Article 47, MStGB. The
new language not only makes German individuals passive subjects of general international criminal law at least within German courts, but it also subjects them to the effects of the
historical development of general international criminal law.
It accepts certain of. the results of the preamble of Hague Convention IV, which consecrates the development of international
law in response to international public opinion; and accepts
that method of development, at least in part, as a general principle of German military justice. Article 47, MStGB, version
of 1940, subjects individuals not only to punishment for vio-

MITCHELL FRANKLIN

lation of criminal legislation ("Strafgesetz" in the language of
Article 47), but also to punishment for acts punishable by
analogy to such penal legislation. Article 47, MStGB, therefore now punishes violation of criminal legislation ("Strafgesetz") and "an act (Handlung), which had in view a general
or military major or minor crime." The latter includes crimes
by analogy. Articles 1 and 2, MStGB, are the basis for this.
The legal method of Article 2 of the German Criminal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch-StGB), as introduced in 1935, thus becomes
-thelegal method of Article 47, MStGB. 28 According to Article
2, StGB, punishment may be inflicted for an act which "de-serves penalty according to the basic principles (Grundgedanken) of criminal legislation (Strafgesetz) and according to the
healthy feeling of the race (gesundes Volksempfinden)."
Stripped of its National Socialist goal (Zweck), as expressed in
the irrational fascist formula "gesundes Volksempfinden", Article 47, MStGB, thus opens up the entire German "general"
.and military criminal law for exploitation and development
.against fascist war criminals.
Shorn of the goals and ideals received from National Socialism,29 Articles 1 and 47, MStGB, and Article 2, StGB, thus

-correspond very much to the effect of the preamble 9 f Hague
Convention IV of 18 October 1907, which, as has been
.shown,80 provides that in "cases not included in the Regulations" "the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience."
Much has been said against punishment by analogy, and the
antagonism to such punishment goes back to the French Revolution. In 1808 Article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which
-was a redaction of the French projet of the Year VIII (1800),
restricted the process of development by analogy to civil cases.
In 1812 the Supreme Court in United States v. Hudsons1 held
that there should be no penalty without a text, even in a legal
xegime where the uncodified common law obtained. This case
must be maintained as a principle of American constitutional
law (not merely as an interpretation of a particular statute)
28 Schwinge, supra, note 26, at pp. 4-5; Rittau, supra, note 18, at

p. 59.29

Military government legislation, such as quoted in the first part
of this essay, has accomplished this. Such texts as Article 2, StGB, have
also been overcome by military government legislation.
30 See second part of this essay.

81 See supra, note 9. France, of course, has been the classic land
requiring punishment based on a text. But this has not excluded analog.ical development of certain texts of the penal code. Thus, the law of
excuses or justification was developed from Article 827, C. pdn. See
Garraud et Labore-Lacoste, supra, note 11, at no. 94.
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because criminal proceedings are not among the "cases in law
and equity" arising under the. constitution, to which the judiciary power constitutionally pertains in the absence of congressional legislation. Conceived of in this fashion, the opinion of
Justice Johnson contradicts Marbury v. Madison and the theory
of judiciary supremacy, for declarations of constitutionality
also are not "cases in law and equity." Hence United States v.
Hudson is a basic Jeffersonian determination.
Nevertheless the text of the constitution of the United States,
unlike the preamble of Hague Convention IV, is not a text
of general international criminal law. Certainly those AngloAmerican jurists who have clamored that there should be no
,crime without a text have not been renowned as adherents of
the codification, criminal or civil, which would have created
the necessary texts. They have not criticized the history of the
development of Anglo-American criminal law, which until recently has been based on judicial decision. Nor have they condemned the retroactive elements in such a judicial system.
They have not assailed the use of standards or of general clauses
in modem criminal legislation, although punishment under
-such legislation functions almost exactly as does development
of penal texts through analogy. Nor do they perceive the fairness of "objectifying" as much as possible "the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience" referred to in the
preamble of Hague Convention IV by tying criminal adjudication to the more secure base of developing grounds for decision out of existing legislation, as contrasted to the "subjective"
results frustrating and subverting international anti-fascist public opinion, attainable under a "free" conception of "the laws
of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience." Certainly, the penal code of 1926 for RSFSR, under which many
war criminals evidently will be prosecuted, accepts this outlook.
for Article 16 says that:
"Where a socially dangerous act has not been expressly'dealt with in

the present code, the basis and limits of responsibility in respect thereof
shall be determined in conformity with those articles of the code which
deal with the crimes most closely resembling it."32
Finally, something must be said of the role of Article 4 of the
German constitution of 1919 (Verfassung des Deutschen
Reichs=DV) in connection with Article 47, MStGB. This provided:
"The generally recognized rules of international law apply as binding
integral parts of the law of the German Reich."

This text was a development from Article 6.2 of the Constitution of the United States, but it is evident that the scope of the
German text is greater than that of the American consitution,
for, unlike the American formulation, which speaks only of the
32

See supra, note 15.

C/f Schlesinger; Recent Developments in

Soviet Legal Theory; 6 Modern-Law Rev-., 21, 33 (1942).
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effect of treaties, the German article includes both "written
and unwritten international law", including the "Hague con' ' 33
ference decisions.
Article 4 of the German Constitution of 1919 is important
for at least two reasons. In the first plate, under Article 4 it is
not necessary to insist that National Socialist war criminals be
adjudged exclusively in accordance with a formally written
text, such as the German Criminal Code. A regime, similar
to that of the Anglo-American criminal law, which was based
ofi judicial decision, could be the basis for the punishment of
such persons. Certainly under Article 4 it becomes possible to
convict war criminals in accordance with the "general" criminal law; as established in Article 47, MStGB, which consecrates
a regime based both on the "written" law, national and international (such as Hague Convention IV and other texts of
general international law), and on the "unwritten" law, national and international (such as the unwritten developments
from Article 2, StGB, Article 1, MStGB, and the preamble to
Hague Convention IV). In other words Article 4 of the German Constitution accomplishes in a constitutional text what
Article 47, MStGB, accomplishes in a specific way in a military
penal text. The Weimar text and the National Socialist text
can both be aimed at war criminals.3 4
In the second place, Article 4 of the German constitution
makes individuals and organizations, other than the German
state itself, passive subjects of international law, at least in
German courts. German theorists recognize this readily. Thus,
Poetzsch-Heffter wrote in 1928:
"The importance of article 4 lies therein that the generally recognized
rules of international law in the future bind not merely the Reich as the
subject of international law, but on.the contrary the German aithorities
and citizens directly."3 5

And Anschiitz said:
"... international law now affects individuals and state organs (above
all the courts) directly and without formal authorization and obligation

.

.."36

Hence, both Weimar and Berchtesgaden contribute to the
punishment of war criminals.
"3 Anschfitz, Die Verjassung des Deutschen Reichs
(7.Auf., 1928)
46-47.
34 On the limits set to Article 4, DV, see Anschiitz, supra, note 33;
Bfihler, Die Reichsverfassung vom 11 August 1919 (3.Auf., 1929) 44;
Giese, Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vore 11 August 1919 (7.Auf.,
1926) 57; Article 68, DV.
35 Poetzsch-Heffter, Handkommentar der Reichsverfassung vom 11
August 1919 (3.Auf., 1928) 94.
36 Anschiitz, supra, note 33, at p. 47. Anschiitz says that Article
4, DV, thus "nationalizes" international law. See infra, note 42, on the
relationship between "nationalization" of international law and Kelsen's
"intermediate" national stage of international law.
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Source of Theory of Passive Subjects of
InternationalCriminalLaw -

Thus, the misgivings that Schwinge felt in 1936 as to the
"textual" and "legal-political" correctness of Article 47,
MStGB, version of 1872, should have been increased by Article 47, MStGB, redaction of 1940, and by Article 4 of the German constitution of 1919; for the effect of these formulations
was to make individuals and groups, other than the Reich itself,
unqualified passive subjects of international criminal law, at
least in the German courts and in German administration.
From here it is but a step to treat individuals and groups as
unqualified passive subjects of international criminal law in
other national courts and even to establish international courts
for invoking sanctions against such passive subjects of international law. This step can be taken through the theory of the
unjust war, through the preamble of Hague Convention IV
and through the analogy of Article 50, Hague Convention IV,
relating to the imposition of collective penalties. It must be
determined whether this conclusion is supported or prevented
by other texts.
It is a platitude to say that only states are the active and passive subjects of international law.37 As Kelsen puts it in this
connection
"The collective responsibility of a State for its" own acts excludes, according to general international law, the individual responsibility of the
person who, as a member of the government, at the command3 8 or with
the authorization of the government, has performed the act,"

and
"Since the demand to punish the war criminals aims at individual responsibility of the persons who by their conduct have performed the
to satisfy this demand on the basis of general
crimes, it seems impossible
international law."39

Kelsen dismissed the situation of the pirate as "exceptional"; 0
and hence this passive subject of international law has not been
used as the basis for productive or analogical reasoning. although it has been shown that the preamble of Hague Convention IV justifies analogical development to realize the demands
of international public opinion:
Nevertheless, it must be indicated that the category of the
war criminal is established through Article 3, Hague Convention IV:
"A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay indemnity. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed
forces."
3
7 Manner: The Legal Nature and Punishment of Violence Contrary
to the Law of Nations, 37 Am.J. Int. Law 406, 407 (1943) ; see Heilborn,
infra,
3 note 57.
8 Kelsen, supra, note 9, at p. 540.
3
9 Kelsen, supra,note 9, at p. 534. See also Kelsen: General Theory
of Law and State (1945) 355.
" Kelsen, supra, note 9, at p. 534.
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Kelsen's reasoning in this situation seems to be that

11.. international law obliges the States, whose subjects have, as members of their own armed forces, violated the laws of warfare to punish
the criminals; and general international law authorizes the belligerents to punish an enemy subject who has fallen into the hands of their
authorities as prisoner41 of war for having violated, prior to his capture,
the laws of warfare."

But
"By obliging the States to punish their own war criminals and by authorizing the States to punish the enemy war criminals, international
of war criminals. It
law provides, at least indirectly, for punishment
leaves to national law to specify the penalty .... ,42

However, the text of Article 3 does not purport to exclude
individuals and organizations as passive subjects of general
international criminal law, "directly" or "indirectly." It recognizes the legal category of the war criminal, and introduces
the question of indemnity or of reparation for such war crimes.
In effect it establishes a regime of suretyship, as it does not exclude the possibility of imposing reparatory sanctions against
war criminals in accordance with the law of suretyship. Furthermore, it does not exclude the possibility that the war criminal shall be treated as a passive subject of general international
criminal law. It does not exclude, moreover, the possibility of
imposing "direct" plural criminal responsibility on the offending state and on the war criminal himself.
As Article 3 consecrates the concept of the war criminal in
general international law, it is difficult to suggest that the punishment of the war criminal is absolutely qualified in the manner indicated by Kelsen, whose theory seems to permit thewrongdoing state to shield the war criminal by omitting punishment or by providing for trivial punishment. It is difficult
to believe that Article 3 merely introduced a regime of imperfect and of natural obligations, 43 as these were understood in
4

lKelsen, supra, note 9, at p. 558. On Kelsen's theory of "general
international law," see supra, note 3.
42 Kelsen, supra, note 9, at p. 554. See also, supra, note 36, discussing the "nationalizing" effect of Article 4, DV. "The application of
national law to the war criminal is at the same time execution of international law. The national law is an intermediate stage made necessary
by the State constitution authorizing the courts to apply only norms
created by the lawmaking organ of the state. If no such constitutional
restriction exists, or if according to the constitution, international law
is considered part of the national law, a direct application of the international rules of warfare by the courts of the State is possible. Since,
however, these rules do not specify the punishment, an act of national
law determining the penalties for war crimes is always necessary if these
crimes do not constitute at the same time ordinary crimes according to
the criminal law of the State." Kelsen, supra, note 9, at p. 555. This
limitation must immediately be rejected for the punishment of war criminals who have instituted unjust war. See also Schwartzenberger, "International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness" (1943) 59-60.
4s Thus, Article 1, Hague Convention IV, provides that "The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces which
shall be in conformity with the Regulations . . ."

Kelsen's theory, as.

quoted, that the offending state is to fix the penalty for war crimes can
become a negation of the conception of general international criminal
law and of Article 1. In thus overcoming Hague Convention IV this.
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eighteenth century private law. As to this, Article 56, Hague
Convention IV, which develops Article 3, seems to hold decisively to the contrary, for it provides that the seizure, destruction or wilful damage done by war criminals to national,
cultural or religious monuments
.. is forbidden, and prosecution is obligatory (interdite et doit etre
poursuivie) "44

The enforcement of this text certainly was not left to the will
of the offending state, particularly since many of the states adhering to the convention of 1907 recognized no crimes except
those consecrated in codes, rejected the theory of crimes by
analogy, and even excluded immediate reference to international law in internal judicial activity. The latter was true of
Germany, which did not permit its courts, unlike the United
States, to refer directly to international texts before the reception of Article 4 of the Weimar constitution of 1919.
It should be noted that National Socialist military jurists
have not hesitated to assert their own power to make individuals passive subjects of international criminal law. Thus, in
discussing Article 158, MStGB, which deals with prisoners of
war detained by Germany, Rittau says that it is disputed
whether such prisoners may be punished for
".. . acts committed before the capture . . . according to Fuhse, the

position seems to leave nothing but natural (or "moral") obligation.
See Articles 1757, 1758, Louisiana Civil Code. Indeed, Kelsen's limitation, as quoted, interposes in effect a potestative condition (or "illusory"
promise), which would make general international criminal law subject
to the volition of the offending state. See Article 2034, Louisiana Civil
Code. But, on the contrary, Hague Convention IV must be fulfilled in
good faith through the intervention, if need be, of the states offended.
Otherwise Article 1 is worthless. The reasoning of Articles 2037, 2040,
2042, 1901, of the Louisiana Civil Code, is applicable.
The weakness in Kelsen's theory may be shown by illustrations.
Thus, certain serious offenses of general criminal law may be punished
only by military arrest for six weeks. Article 29, MStGB. Moreover,
prosecution by the all-important military legal functionary, the Gerichtsherr, is not compulsory for most military offenses. Article 47 of the
Decree on War Criminal Procedure of 17 August 1938 (RGB1 1939 I,
See also Rittau,
1457 (Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung- KStVO).
supraq, note 18, discussing Article 1, MStGB.
44The English translation of Article 56 reads "...
is forbidden, and
should be made the subject of legal proceedings." Cf. supra, note 12.
But Article 46, Hague Convention IV, is translated as "Family honour
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice, must be respected (doivent etre respectes)."
Article 54, Hague Convention IV, is translated as "Submarine cables ...
must likewise be restored (devront igalement etre restitutds) and compensation fixed when peace is made."
French legal usage of the verb devoir. ["Agreements] ... must be
performed (doivent etre exicut6es) with good faith" (Article 1134,
C.civ.fr., as translated in Article 1901, Louisiana Civil Code). "The
payment must be made (dolt etre fait) to the creditor . . ." (Article

1239, C.civ.fr., as translated in Article 2140, Louisiana Civil Code).
"If he who has received bona fide has sold the thing he is bound to redoit restituer) only the price of the sale" (Article 1380, C.civ.fr.,
store (il
as translated in Article 2313, Louisiana Civil Code). "He to whom property is restored must refund (doit tenir compte) to the person who possessed it . . ."

(Article 1318, C.civfr., as translated in Article 2314,

Louisiana Civil Code).
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answer is in the affirmative, under the presupposition that penal prosecution is permissible under Articles 3 et sqq., StGB (old text), Articles
160, 161, MIStGB, while von Verdrosz represents the conception that on
principle every Detaining State may punish crimes committed abroad by
enemy soldiers after their capture, also common war crimes committed
on the command of4 5an officer, such as plundering, rape, mistreatment
of civil population."

Even if the qualification on the punishment of war criminals
suggested by Kelsen is accepted, it may be swept aside after the
military occupation of the offending state. In that situation
Article 43, Hague Convention IV, becomes decisive:
"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life (i'ordre et
la vie publics) while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws
46
(lois) in vigor in the country."

Article 43 is a provision dealing with the duty of the military
occupant to reestablish and assure public order and life. This
obviously makes it possible for the occupant to employ the law
of the occupied state in regard to criminal acts committed after

the occupation. But it also seems to make it the duty of the
occupant to punish violations of criminal law committed before the occupation, for that is an aspect of the reestablishment
or restoration (r~tablir) and assurance or ensurance (assurer)
of public order and public life.
Certainly Article 47, MStGB, which makes it an offense to
violate the "general" laws of the Reich, includes violations of
general international criminal law as accepted in the Reich.
However, even without Article 47, MStGB, the word "lois" in
Article 43, Hague Convention IV, is broad enough to include
German treaty responsibilities. It is true that the word "lois"
has the narrow sense of "statutes", but it is a word which also
has the broad sense of "law in general"; and the latter is the
meaning which would include responsibilities under general
international criminal law. In short, loi in the context of
Article 43, is as broad as droit, just as Gesetz may.be as broad as
Recht, and lex as broad as ius. In countries, such as France,
where a code is the general type of law, loi tends to supersede droit as a general expression for law.
It may be suggested that Article 43 is inapplicable because
the basis of the power of a military occupant is occupation
(Article 42, Hague Convention IV), and hence should begin
and end with the beginning and termination of occupation.
However, this is not what Article 43 says.
45

Rittau, supra, note 18, at p. 220.

48 Before discussing Article 43, it is proper to point out that the

English translation of this text is not exact in several respects. In particular, it should be stated that the phrase "public order and life" has
been translated as "public order and safety," which is an unjustified
limitation of the scope of Article 43. See Schwenk, supra, note 12, and
supra, note 44.
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Article 43 establishes three principles: (1). The occupying
power may introduce his law of military government, in whole
or in part, subject to the restrictions of general international
law set out in Articles 43-56, Hague Convention IV. (2). The
occupying power may retain "the laws in vigor in the country,"
in whole or in part. (3). The occupying power may perform
acts of fulfillment or administration, or, perhaps, exercise the
powers of a syndic in relation to the internal legal system. The
power of punishment for prior violations of general international criminal law is thus within "the authority of the legal
power" which has "in fact passed into the hands of the occupant."
Therefore, it is not necessary to use Article 47, MStGB, to
discover the passive subjects of international criminal law.
Hague Convention IV itself created the basis for punishing
criminals under general international criminal law when Artide 43 was formulated and accepted. The only prerequisite
for such punishment is occupation of the offending state under
Article 42 and seizure of the persons who had violated general
international criminal law.
Something must be said of the impact of this theory of power
over war criminals, that is, over persons as passive subjects of
international criminal law, on territorial theories of criminal
law.
Evidently territorial conceptions of law must be qualified if
individuals are thus made passive subjects of international
law. The legal basis for the imposition of sanctions against
such passive subjects of international law thereupon derives
from physical control of the offender, and justification for his
punishment under general international criminal law. This
system should function smoothly under the regime established
at San Francisco by which the maintenance of peace is entrusted to the five most powerful members of the grand alliance.
The National Socialists themselves had impaired the conception of territorial sovereignty through their racial and imperialistic ideas, which supported a personal theory of jurisdiction. It is not important to discuss Article 3 (2), StGB, as formulated by the National Socialists. But more important is
Article 1 of the Decree on Special War Crimes of 17 August
1938 (Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung= KSSVO) 4 which
provided that
"(1.)

The German Criminal Code also obtains for all persons who are
subject to the Military Criminal Code [MStGB].
The criminal law obtaining for them is to be applied to these
persons also at the time when they commit the offense abroad."

"(2.)
47
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It is not surprising that the military jurist Dietz, who said that
"The criminal law fundamentally should apply for all criminal acts,
which a German commits at home or abroad (formerly territorial, now
the personal principle ... ),48

49
adds that "the soldier carries his code with him."
Therefore, the military jurist Rittau, in discussing the control of German prisoners of war in the prisoner of war camps
of the United Nations, does not hesitate to write that

".... for German prisoners of war the relationship of superior and inferior continues to endure even in enemy prisoner of war camps--in
relation to the German Criminal law (see Article 1, KSSVO). "' 5o

Considering that their law tended to make Germans passive
subjects of international law through Article 47, MStGB, the
National Socialists make a mockery of Kelsen's belief that it is
improper to require soldiers to "know" general international
criminal law, even though they may be expected to "know"
their own national criminal law; for the National Socialists
have abolished the distinctions on which Kelsen's criticism of
those who would punish fascist war criminals seems to depend
The National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft As a Subject
of InternationalLaw
It has been indicated that a resource of those antagonistic to,
the punishment of German war criminals has been Article 3,
Hague Convention IV. On the contrary, the real question is.
whether Article 3 has any relevance in fixing the limits of the
power to punish German war criminals.
National Socialism itself answers this question. General international law of the nineteenth century presupposed that a
state (usually on geographical grounds) "accepted" its members. It may be assumed that the presupposition of state ac-ceptation reflected eighteenth century ideas of social contract..
The corollary of this was that other states were excluded from
simultaneous acceptation of the same members. National Socialism, however, repudiated the concept of acceptation, and
set itself up, not only as a form of aggression and war against
other states, but as a form of war against certain members of
the German state itself. National Socialism waged two kinds
of war against members of the German state: it conducted absolute war against German Jews, and relative war against the
members of the different political parties which reflected the
anti-fascist interests of different sections of life in the Weimar
republic. The war against the German Jews was absolute, because it was a war of extinction. The war against the members
of the anti-fascist political parties was relative, because it was a
48 Diets, supra, note 17, at p. 31.

49 Diets, supra, note 17, at p. 31.
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50 Rittau, supra, note 18, at p. 223.

Cf. Kelsen, supra, note 9, at pp.

SANCTIONS AGAINST

WAR CRIMINALS

war intended to worsen the position of the supporters of those
,parties in German society, and yet to win the political consent
of the supporters of those parties to National Socialism. The
racial concept of the Volksgemeinschaft, which was the ideological weapon employed by National Socialism in its wars in,
the German interior, therefore became the basis for organizedGerman social life. It is worthwhile to pursue the effects of
the theory of the Volksgemeinschaft, even though National Socialist responsibility for crimes against Germans also derives.
from the undertaking to commit an unjust war, that is, from
an undertaking in the sense of Article 87, StGB, which connotes
responsibility even for less than a successful effort to wage
illegal war.
Because of the racial concept of the Volksgemeinschaft it is
impossible to separate the inner wars of National Socialism
from its outer wars. It is the expression of the aggressions of
German fascism. From seventeenth and eighteenth century
French and English thought, Hegel had received into Germany
the idea of civil society, with its system of wants. On this system of human wants in civil society rested the state, which was
constituted, Hegel said, because the satisfaction of wants in
society was unequal. The theory of wants in civil society has.
been and continues to be the fundamental sociological
conception of the states fighting National Socialism. But in
reactionary Prussia it was believed that Hegel had fatally corn-.
promised the idea of the state, and German theory assumed
the task of finding a new foundation for politically organized
society. This meant that both civil society and the state had
to be overcome, and. the disunity subdued and replaced by a
spiritual unity. This ideal unity is attained through the racial
Volksgemeinschaft. This conception is the upsidedown way
of expressing the National Socialist justification for wagifig war
both within and without Germany.
The Volksgemeinschaft, or the racial community, therefore,
was a form of war against the state as presupposed by such texts
-as Article 3, Hague Convention IV, and by general international law. As Vermeil, describing National Socialism appropriately in Kantian terms, says:
"The Nazi state is therefore, to employ a philosophic term, the phenomenon in relation to this noumen, which is the sotal of the race." 5 '

The German state presupposed by international law in theory
was either abolished or was absorbed in the higher unity of the
idealistic Volksgerneinschaft. As the Volksgerzeinschaft or racial community superseded the classic state as the subject of'
international law, "it may be asked," as Vermeil does,
"what is the exact relation between Race (Volk)
51

and State (Staat)?

Vermeil, Doctrinaire&de la rivotution allemande (1938) 263. See
Harris, supra, note 7.
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Is it the Race or the State that engenders law? For Gfirke the only
State that exists is the racial state. This alone is a 'subject' of inter-

national law."52

This does not mean that National Socialism is helpless in the
present period. Disguised National Socialism or its successor
may be expected to raise aloft both the banners of the Rechtsstaat53 and of "classic" international law during the period of
military occupation of the Reich, with the view of supporting
theories of internal and external law favorable to it. Indeed,
even at the peak of National Socialist power, in which Volksgemeinschaft became the subject of international law, National
Socialism also exploited classic theories when it was advantageous to do so. As Vermeil says:
".. . Nazism decried the contradiction and deliberately maintained it.
It set itself to recognize international law and at the same time to minimize it.54

There are weapons, then, which National Socialist war criminals may attempt to seize. Article 3, Hague Convention IV, may
be supposed to be such a weapon. But under National Socialist
theory itself, racial Germany has not been the state presupposed
in Article 3. Germany of the Volksgemeinschaft only masked
itself, when it was convenient to do so, as the state envisaged
in Article 3.
The National Socialist regime, although it was a political
regime, may be described as a Scheinstaat or as an dtat simuld.
In modern Roman law there is the concept of simulationsimulated act, lent-name, person interposed, disguised act, contre lettre - in which an apparent or ostensible situation is negated or altered by the true state of affairs. 55 National Socialism
represents such a simulation. It claimed to be a subject of classic international law, when it was suitable; but at the same time
law obtained, treating German Jews as aliens by forcing them
to fly the flag of aliens, or "uniting" the party with the state.
Indeed, National Socialist Germany was a masquerade. The
Volksgemeinschaft was an improvisation, concealing the warfare of the National Socialist party and its adherents not only
against the world, but against the interests of the German people. Instead of abolishing the classic state and replacing it with
the fictitious racial community, the National Socialist party
disguised itself as that racial community and on occasion as
the German state. It has been the fashion in the highest circles
of the United Nations to denounce National Socialists as "pirates," "brigands," etc., etc., and such descriptions were literally
Vermeil, supra, note 1, at pp. 346.
53 See the forthcoming essay, Franklin, On the Jurisprudence of
National Socialism, in "Interpretations of Legal Philosophy: Essays in
Honor of Roscoe Pound."
54 Vermeil, supra, note 1, at p. 346.
55 Articles 116, 405, BGB; Articles 1321, 911, 1099, C.civ.fr.; Artiles 2239, 1754, Louisiana Civil Code. Cf. the shielding role of the
Anglo-American trust.
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and precisely correct. Thus Justice Jackson, in announcing
his plans to punish war criminals said:
"Early in the Nazi regime, people in this country came to look upon the
Nazi government as not contituting a legitimate state pursuing the legitimate objective of a member of the international community. They
came to view the Nazi as a band of brigands, set on subverting within
Germany every vestige of a rule of law which would entitle an aggregation of people to be looked on collectively as a member of the family of
nations. Our people were outraged by the oppressions, the cruelest
forms of torture, the large-scale murder, and the wholesome confiscation of property which initiated the Nazi regime within Germany. They
witnessed persecutions of the greatest enormity on religious, political
and racial grounds, the breakdown of trade unions and the liquidation
of all religious and moral influences. This was not the legitimate activity of a state within its own boundaries, but was preparatory to the
launching of an international course of aggression and was with the evil
intention, openly expressed by the Nazis, of capturing the form of the
German state as an instrumentality for spreading their rule to other
countries." 56

Article 3,Hague Convention IV, should not then be a fetter
on the punishment of fascist war criminals. On the contrary,
the modem Romanist concept of simulation eliminates the
relevancy of this text, in this context, for through the doctrine
of simulation National Socialism is perceived to be nothing
but a political party organized for and waging war, masked as
the mystical Volksgemeinschaft or even as the very state which
the Volksgemeinschaft purported to overcome.
Paul Heilborn, the German jurist, once wrote:
"The state is older than international law. It presupposes the concept
of the state and the difference between the state and the communal
group (Kommunalverband) as given . . . International law recognizes
as persons only states, not groups (Virbanue) within the state."57

If Heilbom is corrected by pointing out that individuals or
groups may be passive subjects of international criminal law,
the desperate position of National Socialists at the present moment may be understood. The National Socialist apparatus
should be punished, not only for beginning an unjust war, for
waging an unjust war unjustly, but also for preparing unjustly
for unjust war and for waging unjust war against Germans in
preparation for unjust war.
There are, then, two ways through which National Socialist
war criminals become responsible under general international
criminal law. One of them derives from the preamble of Hague
Convention IV, the other derives from the conceptions of National Socialism itself, deprived of National Socialist dissimulation and illusions concerning itself.
56
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